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THE INFLUENCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
INTERDEPENDENCIES ON POST-DISASTER 
RECONSTRUCTION: ELEMENTS OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY THAT 
IMPEDE THE POST-DISASTER RECOVERY EFFORT 
The importance of developing effective disaster management strategies has 
significantly grown as the world continues to be confronted with unprecedented 
disastrous events. Factors such as climate instability, recent urbanization along with 
rapid population growth in many cities around the world have unwittingly 
exacerbated the risks of potential disasters, leaving a large number of people and 
infrastructure exposed to new forms of threats from natural disasters such as flooding, 
cyclones, and earthquakes. With disasters on the rise, effective recovery planning of 
the built environment is becoming imperative as it is not only closely related to the 
well-being and essential functioning of society, but it also requires significant 
financial commitment. In the built environment context, post-disaster reconstruction 
focuses essentially on the repair and reconstruction of physical infrastructures. The 
reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts are generally performed in the form of 
collaborative partnerships that involve multiple organisations, enabling the restoration 
of interdependencies that exist between infrastructure systems such as energy, water 
(including wastewater), transport, and telecommunication systems. These 
interdependencies are major determinants of vulnerabilities and risks encountered by 
critical infrastructures and therefore have significant implications for post-disaster 
recovery. When disrupted by natural disasters, such interdependencies have the 
potential to promote the propagation of failures between critical infrastructures at 
various levels, and thus can have dire consequences on reconstruction activities. This 
paper outlines the results of a pilot study on how elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies have the potential to impede the post-disaster recovery effort. 
Using a set of unstructured interview questionnaires, plausible arguments provided by 
seven respondents revealed that during post-disaster recovery, critical infrastructures 
are mutually dependent on each other’s uninterrupted availability, both physically and 
through a host of information and communication technologies. Major disruption to 
their physical and cyber interdependencies could lead to cascading failures, which 
could delay the recovery effort. Thus, the existing interrelationship between critical 
infrastructures requires that the entire interconnected network be considered when 
managing reconstruction activities during the post-disaster recovery period. 
Keywords: Post-disaster recovery, critical infrastructure, infrastructure 
interdependency. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The financial and emotional burden of natural disasters is expected to increase in the 
coming years (World Bank, 2011). Factors such as urbanization and environmental 
degradation, as well as climate instability are major contributors to the severity and 
the rate at which natural disasters occur since the 1980s (World Bank, 2011). Despite 
all of the mitigation and preparedness measures taken in advance, and which have 
partially succeeded in few cases, the occurrence of natural disasters and their 
consequences in the built environment are almost inevitable. Therefore, there is 
increasing recognition that the reconstruction process can contribute to reduce the risk 
of damage from future disasters, even if the sole reconstruction of the built 
environment will not eliminate the broad ranging consequences of natural disasters 
(Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011). Thus, it is during the post-disaster recovery period that 
disaster vulnerabilities which appear mainly in the forms of economic, social, 
environmental and physical variables need to be minimized (Australian Government, 
2013 ; Bureau of Transport Economic, 2001; Chang et al., 2014).  
Major disasters generally require substantial efforts to rebuild physical infrastructure 
and recover from personal loss (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011). The impact of natural 
disasters can have long-lasting implications for the national development of a country 
as they can impinge development efforts and drain economic resources. This is 
primarily due to the disabled functioning of critical infrastructures, which are essential 
enablers to economic and societal living conditions (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; 
Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). All developed societies, to a large extent, rely on the 
constant operation of a set of vital infrastructure systems such as energy, transport, 
water including sanitation, as well as information and communication technologies 
(ICT). The incapacitation or destruction of such infrastructure systems would have a 
debilitating impact on national security, economic security, and the public health and 
safety of communities (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). 
Disabled critical infrastructures can exacerbate poverty, disrupt large industry as well 
as small businesses activities, and quite often suppress vital lifelines responsible for 
economic activity and service delivery (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 
2012; Hyogo framework, 2005). Given these realities, it is indispensable to develop a 
comprehensive approach for the effective reconstruction of interdependent critical 
infrastructures. 
Analysts and decision makers have recently started to recognize that critical 
infrastructure systems have become highly interconnected and mutually dependent on 
each other’s uninterrupted availability, both physically and through a host of 
information and communication technologies (Dudenhoeffer, Permann, & Manic, 
2006; O'Rourke, 2007). When disrupted by natural disasters, such interdependencies 
have the potential to promote the propagation of failures between critical 
infrastructures at various levels, having dire consequences on reconstruction activities 
(Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009). In this context, infrastructure interdependency 
refers to the reciprocal influence or relationship that exists between two or more 
infrastructures, through which the condition of one infrastructure affects the condition 
of the other infrastructure (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; O'Rourke, 2007). Under normal 
working conditions, the relationship is apparent when critical infrastructures depend 
on the inputs and outputs of services they share between each other (O'Rourke, 2007; 
Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). For instance, in most cases, without electricity, 
a variety of other critical services will also fail during the post-disaster recovery 
period. Energy systems provide power for switches and to operate ICT networks. 
Water and sanitation systems are dependent on electricity to run pumps and control 
systems, as well as to generate petroleum fuels for transportation of repair and 
maintenance personnel. Similarly, ICT systems provide network services (including 
information and telecommunication services) necessary for the operation and 
supervision of electrical networks. Additionally, energy requires water for cooling and 
to reduce emissions. Transport infrastructure systems provide accessibility to other 
infrastructure operators, recovery crews and the logistics chain during the post-
disaster recovery period, and are in turn dependent upon electrical and ICT systems as 
well as drainage systems. 
It is indisputable that infrastructure interdependencies have always been 
acknowledged by many industries. However, the real challenge is to incorporate and 
prioritise these interdependencies during the reconstruction period to prevent existing 
damage from escalating and resulting in additional damage, which could hinder the 
post-disaster recovery activities. Therefore, in order to develop robust infrastructure 
protection strategies after disasters, it is important to identify and understand the 
overall behaviour as well as the inherent vulnerabilities of these interdependent 
systems during the recovery period. This paper contributes towards an understanding 
of the risks that interdependencies pose to the post-disaster reconstruction of critical 
infrastructures. The paper also examines the fundamental roles that interdependency’s 
dimensions including the types and degrees of interdependencies play in impeding 
post-disaster recovery effort. 
 
 2. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES  
One of the main challenges in overcoming the damaging effects of critical 
infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery is to understand the 
meaning of the concept of interdependency itself. Additionally, critical infrastructures 
being large complex systems, very often made of large collections of interacting parts 
and entities, understanding and preventing the propagation of failure due to 
interdependency remains a major technical challenge for the construction industry 
(Alesch, 2005; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009). To a large extent, targeting 
infrastructure interdependencies during post-disaster recovery requires an 
understanding of the dynamics and characteristics that underline not only the 
individual functioning of critical infrastructures, but also the linkage between them. 
Conscious of their criticality, several organisations around the world have been 
seeking to manage infrastructures and reduce the impact of their failures on the well-
being of society (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012; Hyogo 
framework, 2005). Infrastructures owners have recognised the need for clear 
identification of their assets’ criticality in order to know exactly which assets to 
protect, how well to manage them as well as how to prioritise the reconstruction 
process. The list of critical infrastructures varies across countries and changes over 
time. In 1996, for example, US President Clinton signed the Executive Order 13010, 
establishing the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) 
(Clinton, 1996). This Executive Order (E.O.) listed and classified critical 
infrastructures according to their national importance. These critical infrastructures 
included: 
           • Telecommunications; 
           • Electrical power systems; 
           • Gas and oil storage and transportation; 
           • Banking and finance; 
           • Water supply systems; 
           • Emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and 
           • Continuity of government (Clinton, 1996).  
In 2004, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIPD) 
provided a much broader list with approximately 1,700 infrastructures considered to 
be critical (Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). Several infrastructures that were identified 
were not listed in previous reports. Nuclear power plants, for example, have recently 
been considered to be a critical infrastructure in some countries; while they are still 
non-existent in others (Moteff & Parfomak, 2004; Partnership, 2006). The variation in 
number of critical infrastructures over time is mainly due to the ever evolving 
influence that technological, economical and geo-political factors have on public 
safety (Australian Government, 2012 ). Nevertheless, the scope of this research is 
limited to critical infrastructures that predominantly form the resource pillars on 
which the global security and prosperity of a country such as Australia stands. As 
mentioned earlier, these critical infrastructures vary in numbers but are essentially 
limited to energy (including electric power), transport (including roads and railway 
systems), water supply (including sanitation), and Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) systems (Australian Government, 2012 ; Bureau of Transport 
Economic, 2001).  
As much as these infrastructures are considered to be critical, some are more critical 
than others during post-disaster recovery, and within the same infrastructure, various 
elements can be more critical than others, either because failures due to 
interdependency have minimal impact on them, or because failure of one 
infrastructure does not preclude the other to function (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Energy 
and ICT systems for example, are considered as high priority systems during recovery 
as they provide services directly to most infrastructures, unlike water systems from 
which other infrastructures could possibly abstain, depending on the circumstances. 
However, this does not exclude the fact that both potable water and wastewater 
evacuation and treatment are fundamental to the well-being of the community. In 
many ways, water is essential to minimise the risk of untreated effluents from 
contaminating water systems where humans come into contact, especially after floods 
and cyclones. The criticality of infrastructures during recovery depends to a large 
extent on the amount of services needed not only by the local community but also by 
other dependent infrastructures in order to recover quickly from natural disasters. In a 
series of recent interviews conducted in Queensland, Australia, as part of this study, 
five out of seven infrastructure’ owners rated ICT as being the most critical 
infrastructure during the recovery period as the inoperability of such systems would 
inevitably hinder the recovery efforts of not only the dependent critical infrastructures 
but also the recovery crews involved in the reconstruction process. Being unable to 
communicate with recovery crews or other community members was considered by 
respondents as being the worst case scenario that could be encountered during and 
after disasters. Only two respondents rated energy and transport systems as being the 
second most critical after ICT systems. Having constant electricity and available 
access and mobility (through roads, bridges or rails) to reach damaged infrastructure 
was also considered indispensable during recovery. Nonetheless, when taking these 
factors into consideration, it appears evident that securing a unique infrastructure, 
isolated from all other interdependent infrastructures has become increasingly 
inefficient, particularly during post-disaster recovery. 
 
3. ELEMENTS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCIES 
WHICH AFFECT POST-DISASTER RECOVERY  
Interdependencies are generally driven by the need to maintain interactions between 
critical infrastructure, in order to deliver efficient services that are transmitted both 
physically and through a host of information and communication technologies. 
Disruption of critical infrastructures due to interdependencies generally falls into two 
categories: physical disruptions (which may correspond to shortage of 
supply/consumption/production of an asset) and cyber disruptions (which may 
correspond to electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks, to name a few). 
It was by investigating these emergent behaviours of critical infrastructures that 
several researchers, including Rinaldi et al. (2001), defined the six dimensional 
characteristics of interdependency as followed:  
             • Types of interdependency; 
             • Coupling and response behavior (or degree of interdependency); 
             • Infrastructure characteristics and environment; 
             • The state of operation of infrastructures; and  
             • The types of failures (Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, & Havlin, 2010; 
Dudenhoeffer et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 2007; Setola, Bologna, Casalicchio, & Masucci, 
2009).  
This paper will mainly focus on the challenges from the types of interdependencies as 
well as the extent or degree to which these interdependencies occur.  
 
3.1 Challenges due to types of interdependencies during post-disaster recovery 
In the interview questionnaires that were tested during the pilot study, the types of 
interdependency were depicted according to the nature and sort of interaction that 
exist between critical infrastructures through the sharing of physical supplies and 
commodities (physical interdependency), virtual information (cyber interdependency), 
the same geographical location (geographical interdependency) as well as the same 
legislation and public opinion (logical interdependency). These classifications were 
performed using key concepts and sub-concepts derived from the notion of 
interdependency described in various literatures (O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 
2001). 
The results revealed that during post-disaster recovery, geographical interdependency 
is considered to be almost an integral part of physical interdependency. Logically, to 
be physically interdependent, critical infrastructures need to be somehow 
geographically interdependent (within the same location, region or country etc.), even 
though the reverse is not obvious. Physical interdependency results from the exchange 
of services between two or more critical infrastructures (O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et 
al., 2001). The change in condition from one infrastructure could have serious impact 
on the functioning of the other infrastructure. Geographical interdependency on the 
other hand, results from the influence that a natural disaster (or external cause) such as 
flood can have on critical infrastructures located in close proximity to one another, 
creating simultaneous disturbance in the state of interdependent infrastructures 
(O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). In this case, the change of condition of one 
critical infrastructure does not affect the operation of the other infrastructure. Thus, 
critical infrastructures that are geographically interdependent are not necessarily 
physically interdependent. Nevertheless, general managers responded collectively that 
during post-disaster recovery, physical interdependencies are usually restored first, 
regardless of the location of the infrastructure. This is why in this research the two 
types of interdependencies have essentially been reconceptualised and examined 
within the physical interdependency facet of critical infrastructures. 
One of the main issues with regards to physical interdependency that was raised by 
general managers and risk practitioners from transport industries was the necessity of 
having inexhaustible resources available in order for infrastructures to continue to 
operate. Therefore to remain physically interdependent, the amount of shared services 
between critical infrastructures needs to be constantly available. Resource availability 
in a sense is also an indication of the performance of a critical infrastructure during 
post-disaster recovery. This anticipation that an infrastructure system will still remain 
operational and continue to provide resources to another infrastructure, allowing it to 
operate during post-disaster recovery, requires a certain level of reliability to be 
established between interdependent infrastructures and their organisations as well 
(Kapur, 2014). Infrastructure reliability in this context refers to the probability that 
resources or services will still be available to facilitate the sharing process between 
critical infrastructures during post-disaster recovery (Kapur, 2014). In this case, 
reliability is measured in function of the availability of resources and represents the 
probability of an infrastructure to continuously produce resources during the recovery 
period. The fewer available resources an infrastructure produces during the recovery 
period, the less reliable it is considered to be. Analysis of data also revealed that the 
challenge in maintaining physical interdependency is not only limited to resources 
availability and infrastructure reliability but it also requires the effective transfer of 
resources from one infrastructure to another. If access to the distribution channels 
from which resources are conveyed and delivered from one infrastructure to another 
are disrupted during recovery, physical interdependency would also cease to exist, 
regardless of the resources' availability or of the infrastructures' reliability. Therefore 
availability, reliability, and transferability or deliverability of resources are considered 
to be essential attributes or main contributors to physical interdependency. If any of 
the above conditions is not satisfied, then the physical interdependency will fail. 
Although cyber interdependency is created through the share of virtual information 
and communication between critical infrastructures during recovery, most critical 
infrastructures possess a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, 
which allow them to individually operate. The main role of ICT in regards to 
interdependencies with other critical infrastructures is to provide telecommunications 
services necessary for the supervision, control and evaluation of the state of these 
systems at any given time (Ventura, García, & Martí, 2010). Therefore availability, 
reliability, and transferability are also essential conditions in attaining cyber 
interdependency. In the same way that physical interdependency will fail if these 
conditions are not reached, cyber interdependency would also be inexistent. Logical 
interdependencies, in contrast, do not rely on these attributes as they are tailored by 
human decisions or factors including procedures and policies that shape a specific 
region. Logical interdependency is also associated to the conformity of critical 
infrastructures to the laws, rules and regulations of their organisations (Dudenhoeffer, 
et al., 2006; O'Rourke, 2007). An example of logical interdependency can be observed 
after a road closure following a natural disaster, which destroyed a section of a 
motorway. The decision of closing the road could necessitate an increase in traffic on 
a parallel railway due to a large number of persons and goods travelling by railway 
instead of using personal vehicle, bus or truck. The increase in rail traffic volume 
would require more electric power to sustain the traffic flow, which in turn could 
possibly generate an overload usage of the electrical network and possibly lead to a 
failure of the latter. Thus, logical interdependency (based on human decisions) 
influences all other types of interdependencies and can hinder the reconstruction or 
repair of critical infrastructures during post-disaster recovery. 
 
3.2 Challenges due to degrees of interdependencies during post-disaster recovery 
The degree of interdependency denotes the extent (or intensity, strength, and 
amplitude), to which interdependencies between critical infrastructures exist and are 
manifest (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; O'Rourke, 2007). This sort of interdependency is 
generally perceived in the reciprocal influence exerted between critical infrastructures, 
which is also observed through the mutual exchange of services that occur among 
them. The strength of the interrelationships between critical infrastructures varies 
considerably. Some interdependencies are loose and thus relatively flexible, whereas 
others are tight, leaving little or no flexibility for the system to respond to changing 
conditions or failures due to natural disasters (O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). 
Loose interdependency implies that infrastructures are relatively interdependent of 
each other at a certain level, and thus the state of one is weakly correlated to the state 
of the other infrastructure (Ventura, et al., 2010). Tight interdependency means that 
infrastructures are highly dependent on one another (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). For 
instance, nineteen percent of respondents amongst general managers agreed that 
energy and ICT systems induce high degree of interdependencies to other critical 
infrastructures systems as they provide services, which are crucial to the functioning 
of these infrastructures at all time. Railway systems for example are strongly 
dependent on electric power to function, while energy systems are loosely dependent 
on railways. Although railway systems provide access and transport for natural gas 
derivatives and energy utilities, disturbance of rails does not necessarily induce the 
disruption of electric power. 
Disturbances tend to propagate rapidly both through and across tightly coupled 
infrastructures. According to Rijpma (1997) and Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 
(2008), tight interdependency is likely to be found with infrastructure systems that 
rely mostly on the use of unifiable, invariant, and time-dependant processes (Rijpma, 
1997; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). These processes must be performed in a 
set sequence to avoid halting the exchange of services at one stage and restart again 
(Rijpma, 1997; Weick, et al., 2008). Rijpma (1997) further explains that such orderly 
systems both increase the likelihood that tasks will be accomplished and that 
disturbances could easily escalate and be diffused more widely to the rest of the 
interdependent systems. Whereas in loosely coupled systems, the production sequence 
can be easily redesigned during post-disaster recovery if a disturbance occurs (Rijpma, 
1997; Weick, et al., 2008). Therefore, tightly coupled systems could cause greater 
concern for the reconstruction and repair of critical infrastructures. This is why it is 
essential to determine the extent to which critical infrastructures are interrelated, and 
in certain conditions to determine whether or not their degrees of interdependence 
could have an impact on their recoveries. 
To determine how strong the interactions between two critical infrastructures exist 
during post-disaster recovery, it is necessary to determine for each infrastructure the 
other infrastructure that it continuously (or nearly continuously) depends on to operate 
normally, and also investigate the channel by which the services are delivered (from 
one infrastructure to the other infrastructure) (Ventura, et al., 2010). Furthermore, time 
is another factor that indicates how strong interactions between critical infrastructures 
are. Time, as a measure of interaction, refers to both the frequency (how often 
exchanges are performed) and the duration (how long infrastructures have been 
dependent on each other). The latter provides an indication of how long supported 
infrastructures could function during post-disaster recovery if they were deprived of 
services coming from the supporting infrastructure (s). According to general managers 
and risk practitioners, a strength capability measure is used to determine the amount 
and the intensity of reciprocal services between infrastructures when faced with such 
complex interactions (Ventura, et al., 2010). However in the case of simple linear 
interactions, considerations are generally given to determining how indirect, or direct, 
interdependencies between two critical infrastructures are, whether they are directly 
connected to one another, or indirectly coupled through one or more intervening 
infrastructures (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Overall temporal interaction affects any other 
degree of interdependency, whether the relationship was generated in the past, the 
present or is ongoing.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The preliminary results of a recent pilot study conducted in Queensland, Australia, 
revealed that the types of interdependencies, including physical and cyber 
interdependencies as well as the degree to which infrastructures interact, have the 
potential to impede the post-disaster recovery effort. The results also revealed that 
within these elements, critical factors such as resources availability, reliability and 
transferability can also impede the post-disaster recovery effort. The continued 
reliability of critical infrastructures is paramount during the post-disaster recovery 
period. As mentioned earlier, the escalating complexity and vulnerability of 
infrastructures due to their interdependencies has been evidenced in recent years by 
their notable failures. For instance, a large-scale power outage could affect 
simultaneously all the interdependent critical infrastructures. The reliable exchange of 
services that occurs between interconnected systems also depends on the uninterrupted 
functioning of these infrastructures. Supposing that interconnected infrastructures fail 
to achieve their intended purpose, interdependencies will be likely to cause more harm 
than benefits to the entire network system during recovery. In this case, there are two 
paradoxical effects associated to the existence or inexistence of interdependencies 
between critical infrastructures. On one hand, interdependencies could generate 
widespread cascading failures amongst critical infrastructures in the aftermath of 
disasters (Buldyrev, et al., 2010). On the other hand, the absence of interdependencies 
as such, could also interrupt the functioning of the entire interdependent network. 
Viewed from this perspective, in a post-disaster reconstruction framework, it is crucial 
to maintain reliable infrastructure interdependencies to both the constancy of shared 
services as well as to the safety of critical infrastructures. 
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